Philosophical Topics 45 (2):181-207 (2017)

Authors
Brian Rabern
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
A common view relating compositional semantics and the objects of assertion holds the following: Sentences φ and ψ expresses the same proposition iff φ and ψ have the same modal profile. Following Dummett, Evans, and Lewis, Stanley argues that this view is fundamentally mistaken. According to Dummett, we must distinguish the semantic contribution a sentence makes to more complex expressions in which it occurs from its assertoric content. Stojnić insists that views which distinguish the roles of content and semantic value must nevertheless ensure a tight connection between the two. But, she contends, there is a crucial disanalogy between the views that follow Lewis and the views that follow Dummett. Stanley’s Dummettian view is argued to contain a fatal flaw: On such views, there is no way to secure an appropriate connection between semantic value and a theoretically motivated notion of assertoric content. I will review the background issues from Dummett, Evans, Lewis, and Stanley, and provide a principled way of bridging the gap between semantic value and a theoretically motivated notion of assertoric content.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics201745219
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael DUMMETT - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.

View all 41 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Myth of Occurrence-Based Semantics.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-25.
Monsters and the Theoretical Role of Context.Brian Rabern & Derek Ball - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):392-416.
Quasi Indexicals.Justin Khoo - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):26-53.
De Se Pragmatics.Andy Egan - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):144-164.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Propositions and Multiple Indexing.Brian Rabern - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):116-124.
Wookiee Statements, Semanticism, and Reasonable Assertion.Eduardo García Ramírez - 2010 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 35 (2):129-143.
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Role of Semantic Content.Jeffrey C. King & Jason Stanley - 2005 - In Zoltan Gendler Szabo (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press. pp. 111--164.
Monsters in Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives.Brian Rabern - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):393-404.
The Semantics of Contextual Shifting and Sensitivity.Brian Rabern - 2012 - Dissertation, The Australian National University
Propositions, Semantic Values, and Rigidity.Dilip Ninan - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):401-413.
Insensitive Enough Semantics.Richard Vallée - 2006 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 10 (1):67-79.
On the Proper Treatment of Semantic Systematicity.Robert F. Hadley - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (2):145-172.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-03-22

Total views
271 ( #27,058 of 2,330,293 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
41 ( #14,470 of 2,330,293 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes