Erkenntnis 83 (2):231-252 (2018)

Authors
Liam Kofi Bright
London School of Economics
Remco Heesen
University of Western Australia
Haixin Dang
University of Leeds
Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of judgment aggregation in science. How should scientists decide which propositions to assert in a collaborative document? We distinguish the question of what to write in a collaborative document from the question of collective belief. We argue that recent objections to the application of the formal literature on judgment aggregation to the problem of judgment aggregation in science apply to the latter, not the former question. The formal literature has introduced various desiderata for an aggregation procedure. Proposition-wise majority voting emerges as a procedure that satisfies all desiderata which represent norms of science. An interesting consequence is that not all collaborating scientists need to endorse every proposition asserted in a collaborative document.
Keywords Philosophy of science  Judgment aggregation  Collaboration  Social epistemology
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Reprint years 2017, 2018
DOI 10.1007/s10670-017-9887-1
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References found in this work BETA

Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1992 - New York: Clarendon Press.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Peer Review a Good Idea?Remco Heesen & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):635-663.
Do Collaborators in Science Need to Agree?Haixin Dang - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5).

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