Cognitive Science 39 (7):1435-1467 (2015)

Authors
Robert Briscoe
Ohio University
John Schwenkler
Florida State University
Abstract
It is natural to assume that the fine-grained and highly accurate spatial information present in visual experience is often used to guide our bodily actions. Yet this assumption has been challenged by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis , according to which visuomotor programming is the responsibility of a “zombie” processing stream whose sources of bottom-up spatial information are entirely non-conscious . In many formulations of TVSH, the role of conscious vision in action is limited to “recognizing objects, selecting targets for action, and determining what kinds of action, broadly speaking, to perform” . Our aim in this study is to show that the available evidence not only fails to support this dichotomous view but actually reveals a significant role for conscious vision in motor programming, especially for actions that require deliberate attention.
Keywords Motor control  Attention  Vision  Consciousness  Dorsal stream  Ventral stream  Dual Visual Systems
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DOI 10.1111/cogs.12226
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References found in this work BETA

Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conscious Action/Zombie Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):419-444.
Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Robert Briscoe - 2015 - In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.
The Neural Dynamics of Seeing-In.Gabriele Ferretti - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1285-1324.
Is Vision for Action Unconscious?Wayne Wu - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (8):413-433.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

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