Distorted reflection

Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new "Qualified Reflection" principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection only if he or she is certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a "Distorted Reflection" principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence. In response to the second question, the essay argues that contrary to a common misconception, not all Dutch books dramatize incoherence—some dramatize a less blameworthy sort of epistemic frailty that the essay calls "self-doubt." The distinction between Dutch books that dramatize incoherence and those that dramatize self-doubt cross-cuts the distinction between synchronic and diachronic Dutch books. The essay explains why the Dutch book for conditionalization reveals true incoherence, whereas the Dutch book for Reflection reveals only self-doubt.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,405

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments.Anna Mahtani - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):443-450.
Diachronic rationality.Patrick Maher - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.
Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.
Dutch Books and Logical Form.Joel Pust - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):961-970.
Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming.Brad Armendt - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:217 - 229.
Bayesian Beauty.Silvia Milano - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):657-676.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
733 (#27,461)

6 months
40 (#109,441)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rachael Briggs
Australian National University

References found in this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 13 (3):7-9.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 14 (3):377-382.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1952 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..

View all 20 references / Add more references