Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85 (2009)

Authors
Rachael Briggs
Australian National University
Abstract
Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new "Qualified Reflection" principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection only if he or she is certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a "Distorted Reflection" principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence. In response to the second question, the essay argues that contrary to a common misconception, not all Dutch books dramatize incoherence—some dramatize a less blameworthy sort of epistemic frailty that the essay calls "self-doubt." The distinction between Dutch books that dramatize incoherence and those that dramatize self-doubt cross-cuts the distinction between synchronic and diachronic Dutch books. The essay explains why the Dutch book for conditionalization reveals true incoherence, whereas the Dutch book for Reflection reveals only self-doubt.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2008-029
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References found in this work BETA

Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
A Reply to My Critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.
Philosophical Papers.George Edward Moore - 1959 - New York: Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.
Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.

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Diachronic Rationality.Patrick Maher - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.
Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming.Brad Armendt - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:217 - 229.
Locke's Theory of Reflection.Kevin Scharp - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):25 – 63.
Dutch Books and Agent Rationality.Daniel Silber - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (3):247-266.

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