Decision Theoretic Model of the Productivity Gap

Erkenntnis 82 (2):421-442 (2017)
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Using a decision theoretic model of scientists’ time allocation between potential research projects I explain the fact that on average women scientists publish less research papers than men scientists. If scientists are incentivised to publish as many papers as possible, then it is necessary and sufficient for a productivity gap to arise that women scientists anticipate harsher treatment of their manuscripts than men scientists anticipate for their manuscripts. I present evidence that women do expect harsher treatment and that scientists’ are incentivised to publish as many papers as possible, and discuss some epistemological consequences of this conjecture.



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Liam Kofi Bright
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

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