Minds and Machines 11 (1):95-99 (2001)
Andrew Boucher (1997) argues that ``parallel computation is fundamentally different from sequential computation'' (p. 543), and that this fact provides reason to be skeptical about whether AI can produce a genuinely intelligent machine. But parallelism, as I prove herein, is irrelevant. What Boucher has inadvertently glimpsed is one small part of a mathematical tapestry portraying the simple but undeniable fact that physical computation can be fundamentally different from ordinary, ``textbook'' computation (whether parallel or sequential). This tapestry does indeed immediately imply that human cognition may be uncomputable
|Keywords||Artificial Intelligence Computation Intelligence Science Turing Machines Boucher, A|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Why Everything Doesn't Realize Every Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):403-20.
How Would You Know If You Synthesized a Thinking Thing?Michael Kary & Martin Mahner - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (1):61-86.
Computing Machines Can't Be Intelligent (...And Turing Said So).Peter Kugel - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (4):563-579.
Computation, Among Other Things, is Beneath Us.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):469-88.
Hypercomputation and the Physical Church-Turing Thesis.Paolo Cotogno - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):181-223.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads47 ( #111,323 of 2,171,709 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #173,816 of 2,171,709 )
How can I increase my downloads?