Minds and Machines 11 (1):95-99 (2001)
Authors |
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Abstract |
Andrew Boucher (1997) argues that ``parallel computation is fundamentally different from sequential computation'' (p. 543), and that this fact provides reason to be skeptical about whether AI can produce a genuinely intelligent machine. But parallelism, as I prove herein, is irrelevant. What Boucher has inadvertently glimpsed is one small part of a mathematical tapestry portraying the simple but undeniable fact that physical computation can be fundamentally different from ordinary, ``textbook'' computation (whether parallel or sequential). This tapestry does indeed immediately imply that human cognition may be uncomputable
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Keywords | Artificial Intelligence Computation Intelligence Science Turing Machines Boucher, A |
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Reprint years | 2004 |
DOI | 10.1023/A:1011257022242 |
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References found in this work BETA
Elements of the Theory of Computation.Harry R. Lewis & Christos H. Papadimitriou - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (3):989-990.
Citations of this work BETA
The Modal Argument for Hypercomputing Minds.Selmer Bringsjord - 2004 - Theoretical Computer Science 317.
Toward a Formal Philosophy of Hypercomputation.Selmer Bringsjord & Michael Zenzen - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (2):241-258.
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