Legal theory, legal interpretation, and judicial review

Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (2):105-148 (1988)
I argue that disputes within constitutional theory about whether recent supreme court decisions exceed the scope of legitimate judicial review and disputes within legal theory about the nature and determinacy of law are best seen and assessed as disputes over the nature of legal interpretation. I criticize the interpretive assumptions on which these disputes generally depend and defend a theory of interpretation which tends to vindicate the determinacy of law even in hard cases and the style of recent court decisions which many critics find troublesome
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Objectivity in Law.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (3):240-249.
How a Statute Applies.Barbara Baum Levenbook - 2006 - Legal Theory 12 (1):71-112.

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