Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology

Oxford University Press (1996)
Abstract
This book is a penetrating study of the theory of mind and morality that Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. Hume rejects any conception of moral beliefs and moral truths. He understands morality in terms of distinctive desires and other sentiments that arise through the correction of sympathy. Hume's theory presents a powerful challenge to recent cognitivist theories of moral judgement, Bricke argues, and suggests significant limitations to recent conventionalist and contractarian accounts of morality's content.
Keywords Ethics  Philosophy of mind  Hume
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Reprint years 2000
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Call number B1499.E8.B67 1996
ISBN(s) 0198235895   9780198235897     9780198250111
DOI 10.1086/233841
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What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Pain, Pleasure, and Unpleasure.David Bain & Michael Brady - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):1-14.
Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation.Allen Coates - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):295-315.
The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory.Philip Reed - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614.

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