Mind and morality: an examination of Hume's moral psychology

New York: Oxford University Press (1996)
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Abstract

This book is a penetrating study of the theory of mind and morality that Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. Hume rejects any conception of moral beliefs and moral truths. He understands morality in terms of distinctive desires and other sentiments that arise through the correction of sympathy. Hume's theory presents a powerful challenge to recent cognitivist theories of moral judgement, Bricke argues, and suggests significant limitations to recent conventionalist and contractarian accounts of morality's content.

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Citations of this work

What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Pain, Pleasure, and Unpleasure.David Bain & Michael Brady - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):1-14.
Hume's Geography of Feeling in A Treatise of Human Nature.Don Garrett - forthcoming - In Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.), Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614.
Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 38-58.

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