Philosophia 41 (2):477-487 (2013)
AbstractIn his article, “Wittgenstein and Basic Moral Certainty,” Nigel Pleasants argues that killing an innocent, non-threatening person is wrong. It is, he argues, “a basic moral certainty.” He believes our basic moral certainties play the “same kind of foundational role as [our] basic empirical certaint[ies] do.” I believe this is mistaken. There is not “simply one kind of foundational role” that certainty plays. While I think Pleasants is right to affiliate his proposition with a Wittgensteinian form of certainty, he exposes himself to a tension that exists in On Certainty regarding how we acquire it: is certainty natural, is it social? In this paper, I present two ways in which we come to possess certainty: a bottom-up approach, where certainty is part of our instinctual predisposition, and a top-down approach, where certainty is acquired through positive reinforcement by family and culture
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Citations of this work
Why the Wrongness of Killing Innocents is Not a Universal Moral Certainty.José María Ariso - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 45 (1):58-76.
Sinnott-Armstrong’s Empirical Challenge to Moral Intuitionism: A Novel Critique.Julia Hermann - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):829-842.
References found in this work
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - New York and London: Harper Torchbooks.
Culture and Value: A Selection From the Posthumous Remains.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1977 - University of Chicago Press.