Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312 (2010)

Authors
Selmer Bringsjord
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Abstract
Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is to say, I try to show that this challenge can in fact be met by AI in the foreseeable future.
Keywords knowledge game  self‐consciousness  consciousness  artificial intelligence
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01639.x
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Machines and the Moral Community.Erica L. Neely - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):97-111.
The Philosophy of Information as a Conceptual Framework.Luciano Floridi - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):1-31.
The Philosophy of Information as a Conceptual Framework.Luciano Floridi - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):253-281.

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