Propositions and same-saying: introduction

Synthese 189 (1):1-10 (2012)
Authors
Mark Jago
Nottingham University
Rachael Briggs
Australian National University
Abstract
Philosophers often talk about the things we say, or believe, or think, or mean. The things are often called ‘propositions’. A proposition is what one believes, or thinks, or means when one believes, thinks, or means something. Talk about propositions is ubiquitous when philosophers turn their gaze to language, meaning and thought. But what are propositions? Is there a single class of things that serve as the objects of belief, the bearers of truth, and the meanings of utterances? How do our utterances express propositions? Under what conditions do two speakers say the same thing, and what (if anything) does this tell us about the nature of propositions? There is no consensus on these questions—or even on whether propositions should be treated as things at all. During the second Propositions and Same-Saying workshop, which took place on July 19–21 2010 at the University of Sydney, philosophers debated these (and related) questions. The workshop covered topics in the philosophy of language, perception, and metaphysics. The present volume contains revised and expanded versions of the papers presented at the workshop.
Keywords Propositions  Same-saying  Content  Compositional semantics  Impossible worlds  Possible worlds  Truthmaking
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0091-1
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.

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Citations of this work BETA

Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation.Kris McDaniel - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768.

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