Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2239-2259 (2015)

Authors
Jochen Briesen
Universität Konstanz
Abstract
This paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions—a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a problem can be seen by reconsidering and modifying a well-known argument to the conclusion that beliefs cannot be justified by perceptions but only by other beliefs. Nevertheless, the aim of the paper is not to conclude that perceptions are actually incapable of justifying our beliefs but rather to highlight an overlooked problem that needs to be solved in order to properly understand the justificatory relationship between perceptions and beliefs
Keywords Perception  Evidence  Justification  Propositional attitude  Assertivity
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0407-8
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.

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Citations of this work BETA

Defeating Looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2985-3012.
Can Imagination Give Rise to Knowledge?Madeleine Hyde - 2021 - Dissertation, Stockholm University

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