Synthese 118 (1):89 - 104 (1999)
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Abstract |
Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have full-blown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-representations that are independent of the context
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Keywords | intentionality self-awareness representation consciousness agent |
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Reprint years | 2004 |
DOI | 10.1023/a:1005109414345 |
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References found in this work BETA
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) - 1978 - Bradford Books.
Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
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Citations of this work BETA
Co–Operation and Communication in Apes and Humans.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gardenfors - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):484–501.
Joint Attention, Triangulation and Radical Interpretation: A Problem and its Solution.Ingar Brinck - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (2):179-206.
An Outline of a Theory of Person-Consciousness: Three Kinds of Self-Awareness.Ingar Brinck - unknown
Situating Norms and Jointness of Social Interaction.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2013 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 9 (1):225-248.
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