Mind 118 (470):353-367 (2009)

Authors
Jason Bridges
University of Chicago
Abstract
Although in everyday life and thought we take for granted that there are norms of rationality, their existence presents severe philosophical problems. Kolodny (2005) is thus moved to deny that rationality is normative. But this denial is not itself unproblematic, and I argue that Kolodny's defence of it—particularly his Transparency Account, which aims to explain why rationality appears to be normative even though it is not—is unsuccessful
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzp058
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Thinking How to Live.D. O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.

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