Abstract

The claim that prejudice causes prejudiced beliefs is a familiar one. Call it the causal claim. In this paper, I turn to sexism and sexist beliefs to explore the causal claim within the context of current debates in the ethics of beliefs about moral encroachment on epistemic rationality. My goal is to consider and arbitrate between plausible ways of fleshing out the idea that the non-doxastic dimensions of sexism (including its motivational and affective components as well as its structural and institutional varieties) cause sexist beliefs in a normatively significant way – that is, in a way that can render those beliefs epistemically deficient. I suggest that, in conjunction with the assumption that sexist beliefs are epistemically irrational, each position in the ethics of belief debate lends itself to a different interpretation of the causal claim: purism about epistemic rationality supports a narrow interpretation, while revisionism supports a broad one. After developing each interpretation, I argue that – at the heart of the disagreement between them – is a different story about the normative significance of the fact that evidence about an unfortunate truth has a sexist provenance. Along the way, I consider what it means for evidence to be “stacked in favor” of sexist beliefs.