Species pluralism does not imply species eliminativism

Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305-1316 (2003)
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Abstract

Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.

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Ingo Brigandt
University of Alberta