Social values influence the adequacy conditions of scientific theories: beyond inductive risk

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):326-356 (2015)
Authors
Ingo Brigandt
University of Alberta
Abstract
The ‘death of evidence’ issue in Canada raises the spectre of politicized science, and thus the question of what role social values may have in science and how this meshes with objectivity and evidence. I first criticize philosophical accounts that have to separate different steps of research to restrict the influence of social and other non-epistemic values. A prominent account that social values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive risk. It maintains that the more severe the social consequences of erroneously accepting a theory would be, the more evidence is needed before the theory may be accepted. However, an implication of this position is that increasing evidence makes the impact of social values converge to zero; and I argue for a stronger role for social values. On this position, social values may determine a theory’s conditions of adequacy, which among other things can include co..
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2015.1079004
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The Value of Cognitive Values.Heather Douglas - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806.

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Evidence: Wanted, Alive or Dead.Stathis Psillos - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):357-381.

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