Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):359-372 (2006)

Authors
Jason Bridges
University of Chicago
Abstract
Fred Dretske’s teleofunctional theory of content aims to simultaneously solve two ground-floor philosophical puzzles about mental content: the problem of naturalism and the problem of epiphenomenalism. It is argued here that his theory fails on the latter score. Indeed, the theory insures that content can have no place in the causal explanation of action at all. The argument for this conclusion depends upon only very weak premises about the nature of causal explanation. The difficulties Dretske’s theory encounters indicate the severe challenges involved in arriving at a robust naturalistic understanding of content.
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Rationality  Reasoning
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00269.x
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References found in this work BETA

Mind Matters.Ernest Lepore & Barry Loewer - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (November):630-642.
Ceteris Paribus Laws.Stephen Schiffer - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):1-17.
Causal Relevance.Stephen Yablo - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):316-28.

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