Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267 (2011)
I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against actual sensory feedback are also coded in a perceptual representational format.
|Keywords||Motor control Agentive experience Forward models Comparators|
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References found in this work BETA
The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency.M. Synofzik, G. Vosgerau & A. Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
Voluntary Action and Conscious Awareness.Patrick Haggard, Sam Clark & Jeri Kalogeras - 2002 - Nature Neuroscience 5 (4):382-385.
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When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2000 - MIT Press.
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