The Growing-Block: just one thing after another?

Philosophical Studies 174 (4):927-943 (2017)
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Abstract

In this article, we consider two independently appealing theories—the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience—and argue that at least one is false. The Growing-Block view is a theory about the nature of time. It says that past and present things exist, while future things do not, and the passage of time consists in new things coming into existence. Humean Supervenience is a theory about the nature of entities like laws, nomological possibility, counterfactuals, dispositions, causation, and chance. It says that none of these entities are fundamental, since if they were, this would entail the existence of irreducible necessary connections between matters of fact. Instead, these entities supervene on a fundamental, non-nomological ‘Humean mosaic’ of property instances at spacetime points. We will further explain and motivate the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience in Sects. 2 and 3, but first, we turn to our master argument.

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Author Profiles

Graeme A. Forbes
University of Kent
R. A. Briggs
Stanford University

Citations of this work

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No Time for Powers.Marius Backmann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):979-1007.

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References found in this work

Theories of Actuality.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1974 - Noûs 8 (3):211-231.
A Future for Presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature.Helen Beebee - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):571-594.

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