Utility Monsters for the Fission Age

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):392-407 (2015)
Abstract
One of the standard approaches to the metaphysics of personal identity has some counter-intuitive ethical consequences when combined with maximising consequentialism and a plausible doctrine about aggregation of consequences. This metaphysical doctrine is the so-called ‘multiple occupancy’ approach to puzzles about fission and fusion. It gives rise to a new version of the ‘utility monster’ problem, particularly difficult problems about infinite utility, and a new version of a Parfit-style ‘repugnant conclusion’. While the article focuses on maximising consequentialism for simplicity, the problems demonstrated apply more widely to a range of ethical views, especially flavours of consequentialism. This article demonstrates how these problems arise, and discusses a number of options available in the light of these problems for a consequentialist tempted by a multiple occupancy metaphysics
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12079
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References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Anarchy, State and Utopia.Robert Nozick (ed.) - 1974 - Basic Books.
How Things Persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Many, but Almost One.David Lewis - 1993 - In Keith Cambell, John Bacon & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-38.
Survival and Identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.

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Citations of this work BETA
A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences.Eric Schwitzgebel & Mara Garza - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):98-119.
Divided We Fall.Jacob Ross - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):222-262.

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