Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive

Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497 (2008)
Abstract
In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements – an act of what I call ‘make-perceive.’.
Keywords Enactive Approach  Spatial Representation  Alva Noë  Active Vision  Action-Oriented Representation  Perspectival Properties  Sensorimotor Contingencies
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00351.x
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References found in this work BETA
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Vision.Marr David - 1982 - Freeman.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
Conscious Vision in Action.Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7):1435-1467.
Husserl on Perceptual Constancy.Michael Madary - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.

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