Visuomotor noise and the non-factive analysis of knowledge

Dissertation, University of Edinburgh (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is all but universally accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive: S knows that p only if p. The purpose of this thesis is to present an argument against the factivity of knowledge and in doing so develop a non-factive approach to the analysis of knowledge. The argument against factivity presented here rests largely on empirical evidence, especially extant research into visuomotor noise, which suggests that the beliefs that guide everyday motor action are not strictly true. However, as we still want to attribute knowledge on the basis of successful motor action, I argue that the best option is to replace factivity with a weaker constraint on knowledge, one on which certain false beliefs might still be known. In defence of this point, I develop the non-factive analysis of knowledge, which demonstrates that a non-factive constraint might do the same theoretical work as factivity.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How to Forget that 'Know' is Factive.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):449-459.
'Knows' Entails Truth.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology.J. Drake - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-22.
Mythology of the Factive.John Turri - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):141-150.
Warum Wissen nicht der allgemeinste faktive mentale Zustand ist.Tim Kraft - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):33-65.
Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.
Restricting factiveness.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):29 - 48.
Accidentally factive mental states.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
The New View on Ignorance Undefeated.Rik Peels - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-11-27

Downloads
36 (#425,996)

6 months
7 (#382,198)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Michael Bricker
University of Turku

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references