What is a possible ontological and epistemological framework for a true universal 'information science'?: The suggestion of a cybersemiotics

World Futures 49 (3):287-308 (1997)

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Søren Brier
Copenhagen Business School
Abstract
(1997). What is a possible ontological and epistemological framework for a true universal ‘information science'?: The suggestion of a cybersemiotics. World Futures: Vol. 49, The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information, pp. 287-308
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DOI 10.1080/02604027.1997.9972636
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Minds, Brains and Science.John R. Searle - 1984 - Harvard University Press.

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