What Robots Can and Can't Be

Kluwer Academic Publishers (1992)
Abstract
This book argues that (1) AI will continue to produce machines with the capacity to pass stronger and stronger versions of the Turing Test but that (2) the "Person Building Project" (the attempt by AI and Cognitive Science to build a machine which is a person) will inevitably fail. The defense of (2) rests in large part on a refutation of the proposition that persons are automata -- a refutation involving an array of issues, from free will to Godel to introspection to Searle and beyond. The defense of
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The Role of Convention in the Communication of Private Events.Chris Moore - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):656.

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