Analysis 61 (3):213-24 (2001)

Authors
Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
McKinsey-style reductio arguments aim to show that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged access, the claim that a subject can have a priori knowledge of her thought contents. I defend my version of the reductio against the objections of Falvey, and McLaughlin and Tye. However, I raise and discuss a more serious objection--that it may be difficult for a subject to know a priori that she is agnostic about a concept, given that agnosticism involves being unsure whether a concept applies to things of a certain type when there is a determinate fact whether or not the concept so applies
Keywords A Priori  agnosticism  Epistemology  Individualism  Knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00297
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What's Wrong with McKinsey-Style Reasoning?James Pryor - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200.
Recent Work on McKinsey's Paradox.J. Kallestrup - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):157-171.
Self‐Knowledge and Externalism About Empty Concepts.Ted Parent - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (2):158-168.
Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown.A. Brueckner - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):86-88.

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