Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):765-786 (2016)
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Abstract

Implicit intergroup biases have been shown to impact social behavior in many unsettling ways, from disparities in decisions to “shoot” black and white men in a computer simulation to unequal gender-based evaluations of résumés and CVs. It is a difficult question whether, and in what way, agents are responsible for behaviors affected by implicit biases. I argue that in paradigmatic cases agents are responsible for these behaviors in the sense that the behavior is “attributable” to them. That is, behaviors affected by implicit biases reflect upon who one is as a moral agent.

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Michael Brownstein
John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUNY)

Citations of this work

Responsibility for implicit bias.Jules Holroyd - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3).
Implicit Bias as Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):329-347.
Am I a Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism.Neil Levy - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):534-551.
Bias, Structure, and Injustice: A Reply to Haslanger.Robin Zheng - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1):1-30.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

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