Against Emotional Dogmatism

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):59-77 (2016)

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Elijah Chudnoff
University of Miami
It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other experiences such as bodily sensation, inner awareness, sensory perception, memory, and imagination. On this basis, we argue that dogmatism about emotional justification is an untenable position, regardless of whether the special feature of an immediate justifier that makes it an immediate justifier is its presentational phenomenology or its evidence insensitivity.
Keywords emotions  justification  dogmatism  evidence insensitivity  presentational phenomenology  moral perception
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12076
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
Intention.P. L. Heath & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
It's Not What It Seems. A Semantic Account of ‘Seems’ and Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):210-239.

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Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.

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