Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):313 - 329 (1974)
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| Abstract |
In this paper, I defend the view that the identity of indiscernibles could serve as an adequate basis for a general theory of identity. I then show how a theory of essentialism forces one to modify that general theory. In light of both the original and modified theory, I offer a new resolution of some of the classical and contemporary problems of personal identity
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| DOI | 10.1007/BF00368499 |
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