A logic of comparative obligation

Studia Logica 57 (1):117 - 137 (1996)
Normal systems of modal logic, interpreted as deontic logics, are unsuitable for a logic of conflicting obligations. By using modal operators based on a more complex semantics, however, we can provide for conflicting obligations, as in [9], which is formally similar to a fragment of the logic of ability later given in [2], Having gone that far, we may find it desirable to be able to express and consider claims about the comparative strengths, or degrees of urgency, of the conflicting obligations under which we stand. This paper, building on the formalism of the logic of ability in [2], provides a complete and decidable system for such a language.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00370672
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References found in this work BETA
Krister Segerberg (1971). An Essay in Classical Modal Logic. Uppsala, Filosofiska Föreningen Och Filosofiska Institutionen Vid Uppsala Universitet.
Mark A. Brown (1988). On the Logic of Ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (1):1 - 26.

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