Philosophical Review 117 (2):193-243 (2008)

Authors
Jeffrey E. Brower
Purdue University
Susan Brower-Toland
Saint Louis University
Abstract
This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of this interpretation with the aim of correcting some persistent misunderstandings of the connection between Aquinas's views and those developed by contemporary philosophers of mind.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2007-036
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):394-397.

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Citations of this work BETA

Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude.Ross Inman - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):583-597.
Medieval Theories of Relations.Jeffrey E. Brower - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes.Lionel Shapiro - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):378-418.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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