A paradox of rejection

Synthese 191 (18):4451-4464 (2014)
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Abstract

Given any proposition, is it possible to have rationally acceptable attitudes towards it? Absent reasons to the contrary, one would probably think that this should be possible. In this paper I provide a reason to the contrary. There is a proposition such that, if one has any opinions about it at all, one will have a rationally unacceptable set of propositional attitudes—or if one doesn’t, one will end up being cognitively imperfect in some other manner. The proposition I am concerned with is a self-referential propositional attitude ascription involving the propositional attitude of rejection. Given a basic assumption about what constitutes irrationality, and a few assumptions about the nature of cognitively ideal agents, a paradox results. This paradox is superficially like the Liar, but it is importantly different in that no alethic notions are involved at all. As such, it stands independent of the Liar and is not a ‘revenge’ version of it. After setting out the paradox I discuss possible responses. After considering several I argue that one is best off simply accepting that the paradox shows us something surprising and interesting about rationality: that some cognitive shortfall is unavoidable even for ideal agents. I argue that nothing disastrous follows from accepting this conclusion

Other Versions

unknown Brouwer, Thomas N. P. A. (2017) "A paradox of rejection".

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Thomas Brouwer
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.
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Epistemic dilemma and epistemic conflict.Verena Wagner - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-76.
Belief and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13523-13542.

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References found in this work

In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The paradox of the preface.David Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.
``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.

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