Beliefs and Their Objects

Dissertation, Princeton University (1982)
Abstract
The goal of the dissertation is to sketch an account of the nature of belief states. Chapter One introduces a distinction between belief states and objects of belief. The objects of belief are propositions; belief states are intrinsic states of the believer. Examples from the current literature show that one's belief states do not by themselves determine which propositions are objects of one's belief. ;In Chapter Two I argue that the objects of belief may be divided into what I call "immediate" and "mediate" objects of belief. To one's total immediate object of belief there corresponds a property which characterizes one's belief state essentially and completely. ;A theory of belief should say how intrinsic properties of an individual determine what the individual's immediate objects of belief are, and how one's immediate objects of belief in conjunction with facts about one's circumstances determine what one's mediate objects of belief are. I address the former question in Chapter Two and the latter in Chapter Four. ;Chapter Three defends, against certain, mainly epistemological, objections, an account of the semantics of belief sentences according to which e.g. 'Joe believes that grass is green' attributes to Joe as object of his belief the proposition that grass is green. ;Chapter Five suggests that the distinction between mediate and immediate objects of belief is helpful in thinking about such issues as Kripke's puzzle about belief, whether there can be contingent knowledge a priori, and whether we believe the logical consequences of our beliefs
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,564
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Belief States and Narrow Content.Curtis Brown - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
On the Objects of Belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 1996 - In C. Stein & M. Textor (eds.), Intentional Phenomena in Context. Hamburg.
Subjectivity and the Objects of Belief.Neil Philip Feit - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
What is a Belief State?Curtis Brown - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):357-378.
Perception and Belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
Contradictions, Objects, and Belief.Srećko Kovač - 2007 - In Jean-Yves Béziau & Alexandre Costa-Leite (eds.), Perspectives on Universal Logic. pp. 417.
Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams.J. J. Macintosh - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (4):487 - 503.
'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.
Objects of Thought.A. N. Prior - 1971 - Clarendon Press.
The Naive Conception of Material Objects: A Defense.Daniel Z. Korman - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin
Belief-in and Belief in God: JOHN N. WILLIAMS.John N. Williams - 1992 - Religious Studies 28 (3):401-405.
Added to PP index
2015-02-04

Total downloads
0

Recent downloads (6 months)
0

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
My notes
Sign in to use this feature