Broome, John. Rationality through Reasoning.Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Pp. 322. $99.95

Ethics 125 (4):1194-1199 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Andrew Cullison There is one final worry about bringing emotions into a theory of moral perception that might be best drawn out with an analogy to nonmoral perception. Suppose we were beings with a slightly different nonmoral perceptual apparatus. Suppose phenomenal qualia that we typically experience when we observe objects also showed up in our cognitive life when we weren’t experiencing the presence of an object. Basically, we would periodically have apparent perceptions of objects when there were no objects. Furthermore, suppose we could know that this was sometimes the case. I suspect we would feel rational pressure to be a bit more skeptical about our nonmoral judgments based on perception. One might argue that we’re kind of in that situation if our moral perception apparatus includes an emotional component. We often experience emotions when there is nothing moral about the situation we’re in, and so by analogy to the perception case, we might think that we should be a bit more skeptical about moral judgments. A possible virtue of a moral perception view that didn’t make emotions a component of the view might not have to address this worry, but if emotions are indeed an important part of Audi’s moral perception theory, then it is worth asking why we shouldn’t take ourselves to have some defeaters for moral beliefs. Aaron Bronfman The official topic of John Broome’s Rationality through Reasoning is the “motivation question”: How does the belief that you ought to do something cause you to intend to do that thing? And indeed, the parts of the book do combine to offer an answer to that question. But, as Broome himself suggests, much of the interest comes from the steps along the way. The book greatly expands and develops Broome’s earlier work, drawing rich connections throughout ðaddressing how ought figures in requirements of rationality, how reasons may be defined in terms of ought, whether there is reason to be rational, how rationality is connected to the process of reasoning, etc.Þ. This review considers Broome’s account of four main concepts in turn: ought, reasons, rationality, and reasoning.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,020

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The motivation question.Nicholas Southwood - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3413-3430.
Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - In John Broome (ed.), Rationality Through Reasoning. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1-7.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Rationality of Emotion.Robert M. Gordon - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):284.
Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - 2021 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald de Sousa, Jing-Song Ma & Vincent Shen - 1987 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):35-66.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-07-10

Downloads
107 (#200,856)

6 months
9 (#531,649)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Aaron Bronfman
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references