Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):379-388 (2004)

Authors
Graham Priest
CUNY Graduate Center
Bryson Brown
University of Lethbridge
Abstract
In this paper we introduce a paraconsistent reasoning strategy, Chunk and Permeate. In this, information is broken up into chunks, and a limited amount of information is allowed to flow between chunks. We start by giving an abstract characterisation of the strategy. It is then applied to model the reasoning employed in the original infinitesimal calculus. The paper next establishes some results concerning the legitimacy of reasoning of this kind - specifically concerning the preservation of the consistency of each chunk and concludes with some other possible applications and technical questions
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1023/B:LOGI.0000036831.48866.12
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References found in this work BETA

Against Method.Paul Feyerabend - 1975 - London: New Left Books.
Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.
Inference and Necessity.P. K. Schotch & R. E. Jennings - 1980 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):327-340.

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Citations of this work BETA

Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013).
Real Analysis in Paraconsistent Logic.Maarten McKubre-Jordens & Zach Weber - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):901-922.
Mathematical Pluralism.G. Priest - 2013 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 21 (1):4-13.
Representing the World with Inconsistent Mathematics.Colin McCullough-Benner - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1331-1358.

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