Chunk and permeate, a paraconsistent inference strategy. Part I: The infinitesimal calculus

Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):379-388 (2004)
Abstract
In this paper we introduce a paraconsistent reasoning strategy, Chunk and Permeate. In this, information is broken up into chunks, and a limited amount of information is allowed to flow between chunks. We start by giving an abstract characterisation of the strategy. It is then applied to model the reasoning employed in the original infinitesimal calculus. The paper next establishes some results concerning the legitimacy of reasoning of this kind - specifically concerning the preservation of the consistency of each chunk and concludes with some other possible applications and technical questions
Keywords Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:LOGI.0000036831.48866.12
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,169
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Against Method.Paul Feyerabend - 1975 - London: New Left Books.
Inference and Necessity.P. K. Schotch & R. E. Jennings - 1980 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):327-340.
A History of Mathematics.Florian Cajori - 1894 - The Monist 5:629.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Real Analysis in Paraconsistent Logic.Maarten McKubre-Jordens & Zach Weber - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):901-922.
Dialectical Contradictions and Classical Formal Logic.Kazumi Inoue - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):113-132.
Chunk and Permeate II: Bohr’s Hydrogen Atom.M. Bryson Brown & Graham Priest - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):297-314.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
68 ( #79,405 of 2,191,855 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #42,050 of 2,191,855 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature