Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367 (2010)

Authors
Danielle Bromwich
University of Massachusetts, Boston
Abstract
Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus . But succumbing to the first temptation places one under a burden to justify what is motivationally exceptional about moral beliefs and succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practicality intuition that cognitivist motivational internalism is suppose to capture. In this paper, I offer a way of defending cognitivist motivational internalism, which does not require accepting that there is anything motivationally unusual about moral beliefs. I argue that no belief satisfies the Humean constraint: all beliefs are capable of motivating without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire.
Keywords Cognitivist motivational internalism  Humean theory of motivation  Belief  Desire  Moral motivation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9331-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism.Danielle Bromwich - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):452-471.
Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
Moral Motivation.Connie S. Rosati - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Mapping Moral Motivation.Eve Garrard & David McNaughton - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):45-59.
Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism About Moral Judgements.Mark Van Roojen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):26-49.
An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt2):135-156.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
416 ( #17,815 of 2,419,693 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #44,946 of 2,419,693 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes