Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and retribution

Philosophy 76 (4):561-580 (2001)
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Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to critically appraise J. Angelo Corlett's recent interpretation of Kant's theory of punishment as well as his rejection of Hegel's penology. In taking Kant to be a retributivist at a primary level and a proponent of deterrence at a secondary level, I believe Corlett has inappropriately wed together Kant's distinction between moral and positive law. Moreover, his support of Kant on these grounds is misguided as it is instead Hegel who holds such a distinction. Finally, I attempt to refute the almost timeless retributivist rejection of deterrence-based theories of punishment on the grounds that the latter somehow would condone in some cases the punishment of innocent persons. These individuals almost always demand that no innocent person be punished as a rule of the highest order.

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2009-01-28

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Thom Brooks
Durham University

Citations of this work

Hegel's Complete Views on Crime and Punishment.Andrew Komasinski - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4):525-544.
The Academic Journal Editor—Secrets Revealed.Thom Brooks - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):313-325.
Kant-Bibliographie 2001.Margit Ruffing - 2003 - Kant Studien 94 (4):474-528.

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References found in this work

Is Kant a retributivist?M. Tunick - 1996 - History of Political Thought 17 (1):60-78.
Making sense of retributivism.J. Angelo Corlett - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (1):77-110.

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