Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):469-486 (2015)

Bartek Chomanski
University of Western Ontario
There has been a recent surge in interest in two questions concerning the nature of perceptual experience; viz. the question of whether perceptual experience is sometimes cognitively penetrated and that of whether high-level properties are presented in perceptual experience. Only rarely have thinkers been concerned with the question of whether the two phenomena are interestingly related. Here we argue that the two phenomena are not related in any interesting way. We argue further that this lack of an interesting connection between the two phenomena has potentially devastating consequences for naïve realism. Finally, we consider the possibility of a disunified view of experience that takes perceptual experience to be a matter of both being directly perceptually related to mind-independent objects and property instances as well as consciously representing these entities
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12111
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References found in this work BETA

Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
Perceptual Kinds as Supervening Sortals.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):174-201.
Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability.Somogy Varga - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):376-397.
The Disunity of Perception: An Introduction.Indrek Reiland & Jack Lyons - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):443-445.

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