Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354 (2006)

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Virtue reliabilism appears to have a major advantage over generic reliabilism: only the former has the resources to explain the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that this appearance is illusory. It is sustained only by the misguided assumption that a principled distinction can be drawn between those belief-forming methods that are grounded in the agent’s intellectual virtues, and those that are not. A further problem for virtue reliabilism is that of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere justified true belief. I argue that virtue reliabilism lacks the resources to explain this value difference. I conclude by considering what it would take for a theory to explain the extra value of knowledge over mere justified true belief
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1353/cjp.2006.0015
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,107
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.
Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision.David Lewis - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):239-249.
Agent Reliabilism.John Greco - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):273-296.
Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.T. Paxson & K. Lehrer - 1969 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Reliability and the Value of Knowledge.Wayne D. Riggs - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):79-96.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19--41.
Review: Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. [REVIEW]Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):407 - 416.
Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Skepticism, Reliabilism, and Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:139-147.
Generic Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1992 - Philosophical Issues 2:79-92.
Is There a Value Problem?Jason Baehr - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 42--59.
Reliabilism.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology.Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:173-179.


Added to PP index

Total views
500 ( #15,651 of 2,454,612 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #179,414 of 2,454,612 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes