Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?

Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):51-64 (2011)
According to some recent arguments, if our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, then we do not have moral knowledge. In defense of this inference, its proponents argue that natural selection is a process that fails to track moral facts. In this paper, I argue that our having moral knowledge is consistent with, the hypothesis that our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, and the claim that natural selection fails to track moral facts. I also argue that natural selection is a process that could track moral facts, albeit imperfectly. I do not argue that we do have moral knowledge. I argue instead that Darwinian considerations provide us with no reason to doubt that we do, and with some reasons to suppose that we might
Keywords Philosophy   Evolutionary Biology   Philosophy of Biology
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Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1007/s10539-010-9235-1
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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Citations of this work BETA
Debunking Morality: Lessons From the EAAN Literature.Andrew Moon - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Against Theism, Reconsidered.Jonathan Jong & Aku Visala - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (3):243-258.

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