Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth

In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. Or how I learned to stop caring about truth.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
Praying to stop being an atheist.T. J. Mawson - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):173 - 186.
Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About.Linda Zagzebski - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):353-377.
In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.
Matematica e retorica.Cesare Cozzo - 2011 - Paradigmi (3):59-72.
Truth, pluralism, monism, correspondence.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Realism and Epistemic Theories of Truth.Damian Cox - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):473-486.
Meno and the Monist.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.
Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth.James Beebe - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values.Lynch Michael - 2009 - In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-04-03

Downloads
2 (#1,629,482)

6 months
1 (#1,028,709)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

Citations of this work

Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references