Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm for Assertion and Practical Reasoning

In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press (2011)

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Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
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Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.
Mental Imagery and Fiction.Dustin Stokes - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):731-754.
I—Stating and Insinuating.Elizabeth Fricker - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):61-94.
Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):689-704.

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