Fictions, feelings, and emotions

Philosophical Studies 132 (2):211 - 242 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many philosophers suggest (1) that our emotional engagement with fiction involves participation in a game of make-believe, and (2) that what distinguishes an emotional game from a dispassionate game is the fact that the former activity alone involves sensations of physiological and visceral disturbances caused by our participation in the game. In this paper I argue that philosophers who accept (1) should reject (2). I then illustrate how this conclusion illuminates various puzzles in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Emotions, feelings and intentionality.Peter Goldie - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
What feelings can't do.Laura Sizer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.
Emotions, fiction, and cognitive architecture.Aaron Meskin & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (1):18-34.
Emotional Feelings.Tim Bloser - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):179 - 205.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
337 (#60,246)

6 months
13 (#195,290)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stuart Brock
Victoria University of Wellington