Review of Metaphysics 60 (3):597-642 (2006)

Susan Brower-Toland
Saint Louis University
Commentators have long agreed that Wodeham’s account of objects of judgment is highly innovative, but they have continued to disagree about its proper interpretation. Some read him as introducing items that are merely supervenient on (and nothing in addition to) Aristotelian substances and accidents; others take him to be introducing a new type of entity in addition to substances and accidents—namely, abstract states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that both interpretations are mistaken: the entities Wodeham introduces are really distinct from substances and accidents, but, like substances and accidents, they are concrete (rather than abstract). Moreover, the key to understanding the significance of his theory, I contend, lies in a proper understanding of the theoretical role these entities play in his theory of judgment.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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Reprint years 2006, 2007
ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph200760388
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Adam de Wodeham.John T. Slotemaker - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Aristotle, Arabic.Marc Geoffroy - 2011 - In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. pp. 105--116.
William of Auvergne.Roland J. Teske Sj - 2011 - In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. pp. 1402--1405.

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