Hegel’s Moral Concept of Evil

Dialogue 52 (1):81-108 (2013)
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Abstract

The central aim of this article is to set out the essential elements of Hegel’s conception of evil. I demonstrate that Hegel understands evil primarily as a moral phenomenon. In particular, he identifies evil as a pernicious subjectivism and hypocrisy that undermines the social and institutional conditions for ethical action. An appropriate understanding of his conception of evil points to the centrality of trust to ethicality (die Sittlichkeit).

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Timothy L. Brownlee
Xavier University

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References found in this work

After Virtue.A. MacIntyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):608.
Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness.Roger Crisp & Christopher J. Cowton - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (4):343 - 349.

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