Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):382-393 (2014)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
In Philosophy Without Intuitions Herman Cappelen argues that unlike what is commonly thought, contemporary analytic philosophers do not typically rely on intuitions as evidence. If they do indeed rely on intuitions, that should be evident from their written works, either explicitly in the form of ‘intuition’ talk or by means of other indicators. However, Cappelen argues, while philosophers do engage in ‘intuition’ talk, that is not a good indicator that they rely on intuitions, as ‘intuition’ and its cognates have many meanings that are irrelevant to this particular question. He identifies three other indicators and argues by appeal to case studies that these indicators are not present. I argue here that an account of intuitions as intellectual seemings draws attention to intuition features that Cappelen does not consider. These intuition features appear to be regularly present in the works of contemporary analytic philosophers.
|
Keywords | intuitions as evidence intellectual seemings perceptual seemings |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/phib.12051 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
View all 16 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Towards a Phenomenological Conception of Experiential Justification.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):155-183.
Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From.Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.
Propositions and Compositionality.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):526-563.
View all 18 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Saving the Doxastic Account of Intuitions.Christian Nimtz - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):357-375.
Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify.Matthew S. Bedke - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):253-270.
Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.
A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
Human All Too Human Reasoning: Comparing Clinical and Phenomenological Intuition.H. D. Braude - 2013 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 38 (2):173-189.
Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oup Usa. pp. 270.
Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.
Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
Linguistic Intuition and Calibration.Jeffrey Maynes - 2012 - Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (5):443-460.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2013-02-22
Total views
306 ( #34,584 of 2,508,112 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #58,604 of 2,508,112 )
2013-02-22
Total views
306 ( #34,584 of 2,508,112 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #58,604 of 2,508,112 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads