Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics

Oxford University Press UK (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

At the University of Sheffield between 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume II: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprised of three parts. “Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias” contains chapters examining the relationship of implicit biases to concepts that are central to moral responsibility, including control, awareness, reasons-responsiveness, and alienation. The chapters in the second part—“Structural Injustice”—explore the connections between the implicit biases held by individuals and the structural injustices of the societies in which they are situated. And finally, the third part—“The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice”—contains chapters examining strategies for implicit attitude change, the ramifications of research on implicit bias for philosophers working in ethics, and suggestions for combating implicit biases in the fields of philosophy and law.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Virtue, Social Knowledge, and Implicit Bias.Alex Madva - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Mather Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 191-215.
Revisiting Current Causes of Women's Underrepresentation in Science.Carole J. Lee - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Mather Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias.Katherine Puddifoot - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):421-434.
Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):765-786.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-11-03

Downloads
37 (#442,878)

6 months
17 (#161,246)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Michael Brownstein
John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUNY)
Jennifer Saul
University of Waterloo

Citations of this work

Oppressive Things.Shen-yi Liao & Bryce Huebner - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):92-113.
Black Radical Kantianism.Charles W. Mills - 2017 - Res Philosophica 95 (1):1-33.
Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):697-724.
VIII—What Do We Want from a Model of Implicit Cognition?Jules Holroyd - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):153-179.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references