In defence of a perspectival semantics for 'know'

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):439 – 459 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Relativism offers an ingenious way of accommodating most of our intuitions about 'know': the truth-value of sentences containing 'know' is a function of parameters determined by a context of use and a context of assessment. This sort of double-indexing provides a more adequate account of the linguistic data involving 'know' than does standard contextualism. However, relativism has come under recent attack: it supposedly cannot account for the factivity of 'know', and it entails, counterintuitively, that circumstances of evaluation have features that cannot be shifted by any intensional operator. I offer replies to these objections on behalf of the relativist. I then argue that a version of contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Habermas, Kantian pragmatism, and truth.Steven Levine - 2010 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 (6):677-695.
Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
Contextualism, relativism and ordinary speakers' judgments.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341 - 356.
Virtues, social roles, and contextualism.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):95-114.
Avoiding the dogmatic commitments of contextualism.Tim Black & Peter Murphy - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):165-182.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
152 (#124,752)

6 months
6 (#524,433)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

Citations of this work

What Are Centered Worlds?Shen-yi Liao - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):294-316.
Relativism, metasemantics, and the future.Derek Ball - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10):1036-1086.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

View all 26 references / Add more references