The so-called Meno problem is one of the recent trendy topics in epistemology.1 In a nutshell, the Meno problem is that of explaining why we value knowledge more than true belief. In his recent book The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jon Kvanvig argues quite convincingly that no existing account of knowledge can accommodate the intuition that the value of knowledge exceeds the value of true belief.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.
Similar books and articles
Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?Berit Brogaard - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.
Knowledge Happens: Why Zagzebski has Not Solved the Meno Problem.Trent Dougherty - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):73-88.
Is There a Value Problem?Jason Baehr - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 42--59.
The Evolutionary and Social Preference for Knowledge: How to Solve Meno's Problem Within Reliabilism.Markus Werning - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):137-156.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads528 ( #3,162 of 2,177,955 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #54,789 of 2,177,955 )
How can I increase my downloads?