I know. Therefore, I understand

Abstract
The so-called Meno problem is one of the recent trendy topics in epistemology.1 In a nutshell, the Meno problem is that of explaining why we value knowledge more than true belief. In his recent book The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jon Kvanvig argues quite convincingly that no existing account of knowledge can accommodate the intuition that the value of knowledge exceeds the value of true belief.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,798
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Road to Larissa.John Hyman - 2010 - Ratio 23 (4):393-414.
Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?Berit Brogaard - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.
Knowledge Happens: Why Zagzebski has Not Solved the Meno Problem.Trent Dougherty - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):73-88.
Is There a Value Problem?Jason Baehr - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 42--59.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

528 ( #3,162 of 2,177,955 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #54,789 of 2,177,955 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums