Authors
Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Abstract
I start out by reviewing the semantics of ‘seem’. As ‘seem’ is a subject-raising verb, ‘it seems’ can be treated as a sentential operator. I look at the semantic and logical properties of ‘it seems’. I argue that ‘it seems’ is a hyperintensional and contextually flexible operator. The operator distributes over conjunction but not over disjunction, conditionals or semantic entailments. I further argue that ‘it seems’ does not commute with negation and does not agglomerate with conjunction. I then show that the mental states expressed by perceptual uses of ‘seem’ have non-conceptual, yet perspectival contents. In the final part of the paper I argue that while the content of the mental states expressed by perceptual uses of ‘seem’ are non-conceptual, having a mental state of this type requires possessing conceptual abilities corresponding to what the mental state represents.
Keywords hyperintensional operators  perceptual seemings  nonconceptual content  experience vs seeming
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2013.784481
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,295
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Against Emotional Dogmatism.Brogaard Berit & Chudnoff Elijah - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):59-77.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Kantian Non-Conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Dualism and the Atoms of Thought.Wolfram Hinzen - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):25-55.
Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality.Lei Zhong - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):626-645.
Seemings as Sui Generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.
The Look of Another Mind.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1023-1061.
Perspectival Truth and Color Primitivism.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 1--34.
Personal-Level Representation.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - ProtoSociology 28:77-114.
Does Semantics Run the Psyche?Radu J. Bogdan - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700.
How to Think About Nonconceptual Content.Walter Hopp - 2010 - The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-02-22

Total views
149 ( #70,960 of 2,448,711 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #225,345 of 2,448,711 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes